We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among …rms in which also the timing of R&D investments is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the endogenous formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. This allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are su¢ ciently low, …rms may …nd di¢ cult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are su¢ ciently high, cooperation in R&D constitutes a pro…table option, although …rms also possess an incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely pro…table, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless …rms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.
Introduction
A long-standing theme in the industrial organization literature has been the explanation of the incentives for …rms to form R&D alliances and the analysis of the e¤ects of cooperation on innovation and social welfare. A clear understanding of this phenomenon is indeed crucial to guide technology and industrial policies. In this article we approach this issue by focussing on the role of strategic timing in shaping the incentive for …rms to engage in R&D cooperative agreements (or R&D cartels).
As is well known, a research agreement is an alliance between …rms in order to coordinate their research and development activities in a joint project, and to share, to some extent, the knowledge obtained from this common e¤ort. Therefore, the creation of such research agreements allows the …rms not only to coordinate their research e¤orts but also to improve information-sharing. Many reasons may induce …rms to form research cartels. First, innovation is expensive, and the possibility of cost sharing and avoidance of duplication can strongly diminish the expenses to each member. Second, the risk for a …rm that its own innovation programmes will not produce valuable results is reduced, since a research agreement has greater possibilities of diversi…cation and each member can share risks with the other members. Third, the members of a research alliance can acquire a greater competitive advantage than nonmembers, which implies that there can be a concrete hazard in being left out of such cartels (see on this topic, Baumol 1992; see also Katz The IO literature has also stressed the role of knowledge ‡ows (or spillovers) for R&D cooperation. On one side, both theoretical and empirical studies emphasize how spillovers may enhance the bene…ts stemming from R&D cooperation. When spillovers are high enough, internalizing them produces an increase in the aggregate level of R&D, and the elimination of duplication e¤orts, which clearly leads to a reduction in research expenditures. On the other hand, high spillovers -typical of loose appropriability regimes -also increase the incentive to cheat by partners in research alliances and pro…t from free-riding, thus threatening the stability of the research cartel (Kesteloot and Let us consider, as an example, the pharmaceutical sector. While this sector has witnessed a plethora of research agreements over the last years, probably also in light of the substantial technical and market uncertainty inherent in pharmaceutical R&D, only about one third of all alliances between pharmaceutical and biotechnology …rms are formed at the initial development stage of the new drug (see Rogers et al. 2005 and Recombinant Capital web site). 1 Even though the management literature stresses mainly the role of market uncertainty and risk aversion by …rms in committing capital to highly uncertain developmental projects, we argue that there could be an interplay between the choice of signing a research agreement at a given time and the di¤erent strategies to appropriate innovation rents, such as patenting, exploitation of …rst mover advantage, internalization of information ‡ows, and so on. In this paper we emphasize the strategic use of the timing of R&D investment made by the participants to an R&D collaboration. In particular, a research agreement can strategically be anticipated or postponed to prevent some of its participants from unilaterally exploting a …rst or second mover advantage in the noncooperative scenario.
With the exception of a few papers, very scant attention is paid to strategic timing issues in both theoretical and empirical studies. among the others, Duso et al (2010) , analyze the drivers of alliance dynamics across heterogeneous industrial sectors, and observe that …rms may prefer to wait and enter a research coalition at a subsequent moment of time, since, in each period of time they weight the bene…ts against the costs of being a research cartel member. This study …nds that, on average, four …rms enter a research joint venture (RJV) yearly, while the average entry decreases with the age of these RJVs. In the theoretical literature, a number of papers, departing from d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) pioneering work, have analyzed the e¤ects of research alliances in models with endogenous R&D (see, among others, Katz and Ordover 1990, Kamien et al. 1992 , Suzumura 1992 , Petit and Tolwinski, 1997 . However, in these models, the creation of research agreements is exogenously assumed.
More recently, the endogenous coalition formation literature has attempted to endogenize the formation of R&D cartels by applying noncooperative models of coalition formation (see Bloch 2003 and Yi and Shin 2000 . Here a crucial aspect to assess the stability of a given structure of agreements among …rms is the sign of the externalities of R&D investments which, in turn, depend on the level of spillovers. For su¢ ciently high spillovers, forming a research cartel reduces the underinvestment in R&D, since the externalities due 1 These stylized facts are consistent with what emerges from the R&D Insight database employed by Danzon et al. 2005 , insofar as they assess the propensity to strategically delay some of the agreements over time.
to the public-good nature of R&D investments are internalized. Thus, alliances of …rms can invest more than small groups, and this, in turn, may trigger some …rms to leave the coalition and free ride on the existing cartels. Moreover, di¤erent R&D alliance formation rules may yield di¤erent outcomes in terms of stability of cooperation (see, However, the stability of alliances is no longer guaranteed if …rms are assumed to decide endogenously their timing of investment.
The endogenous-timing approach was …rstly introduced by Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) within a duopoly game. In their extensive game with observable delay, the authors describe a two stage setup in which, at a preplay stage, two players (duopolists) decide independently whether to move early or late in the basic game (e.g., a duopoly quantity game). If both players announce the same timing, that is (early, early) or (late, late), the basic game is played simultaneously. If the players'time-announcements di¤er, the basic game is played sequentially, with the order of moves as announced by the players. It is shown that the two leader-follower con…gurations (with either order of play) constitute pure subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game only if at least one player's payo¤ as follower weakly dominates her corresponding payo¤ in the simultaneous game. When, conversely, the payo¤ of a follower is lower than in the simultaneous case, the only pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prescribes that both players play simultaneously.
A few recent papers have introduced the possibility for …rms to sequence their R&D activities in a model à la d 'Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) with asymmetric spillovers. While some of these works assume a given exogenous timing for the investment game (Goel 1990 Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . The degree of technological spillovers is shown to be crucial for these games to possess strategic substitutes vs. strategic complements attributes and, thus, to give rise to simultaneous vs. sequential endogenous timing R&D equilibria (see . Nevertheless, these models, comparing sequential versus simultaneous move games, do not consider explicitly the possibility for …rms to form research agreements.
Our purpose in this paper is to bridge these two otherwise separate streams of literature, the noncooperative formation of R&D agreements and the endogenous timing approach, with the aim to study the formation of research alliances when the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows for a far more complete picture of R&D agreements, by considering the possible formation of these agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are su¢ ciently low, …rms may …nd di¢ cult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are su¢ ciently high, cooperation in R&D constitutes a pro…table option, although …rms also possess an incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely pro…table, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless …rms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D. Some of these results can provide an explanation to various stylized facts, such as the tendency of …rms to strategically anticipate or postpone their R&D agreements as due to di¤erent levels of their R&D investment costs and spillover rates. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the notation and introduces the setup adopted in the paper. Section 3 and 4 apply this setup by building a model à la d'Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) with symmetric and asymmetric R&D spillovers and present the main results. Section 5 concludes.
The Setup
The typical modelling approach to R&D collaboration among …rms usually assumes that, at a …rst stage, …rms can form an R&D alliance with their competitors and, at a second stage, the formed alliance decides cooperatively its joint level of investment in R&D. At a third and …nal stage, every …rm sets noncooperatively its strategic market variable, typically quantity or price, to compete oligopolistically with all other …rms. Our aim is to introduce a variant of this setup assuming that at the …rst stage each …rm decides not only whether to form or not an R&D agreement, but also the timing of its investment in R&D. More speci…cally, both the R&D agreement formation process and the timing of the investment are made endogenous. Introducing endogenous timing basically determines at which stage of the game a single …rm or an R&D cartel will play its investment in R&D. This feature of the model aims to capture the complementarity between the timing of …rm R&D investments and the formation of a research cartels. We here focus our analysis on the two-…rm case.
R&D Alliances & Timing Formation Game
We assume that, at a pre-play stage, denoted with t 0 , each …rm i (i = 1; 2) sends simultaneously a message to its rival announcing both its intention to form irrevocably an R&D alliance or stay as singleton as well as its intention to commit to a speci…c timing for its R&D investment. Every …rm message set M i can be denoted as: In our model the temporal choice of an R&D cartel is purely strategic and is made to prevent the rival …rm to exploit noncooperatively a …rst or second mover advantage. We will assume that, in order to be formed, a research alliance with a given timing of investment in R&D requires the unanimity of …rms decisions.
If …rms send messages indicating both the same R&D alliance and the same investment timing, then they will sign a binding agreement to invest at the prescribed time. Otherwise, if one …rm disagrees, either on the alliance or on the timing of investment, both …rms will play as singletons the R&D investment game, with the timing indicated by their own messages.
Formally, for i; j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i P (m) = f1; 2g if m i = m j = (fi; jg ; ) and
Note that this R&D agreement formation rule re ‡ects an exclusive membership rule, i.e. one in which the consensus of all members is required to complete the agreement. 
The Investment Game
Once a message pro…le has been sent and a timing-partition, denoted P (m) 2 P, has been induced, each …rm will optimally choose its cooperative or noncooperative investment level according to the timing prescribed by P (m). At this stage, as well as at the following stages, it is assumed that a …rm cannot manipulate its level of investment to convince the rival to renege the timing-partition decided at t 0 .
As in d 'Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) , each …rm i, with i = 1; 2, is assumed to set a …nite level of investment x i 2 X i R + a¤ecting its pro…t via its production cost c i (
which, in turn, in ‡uences the market competition between individual …rms. Denoting with q i 2 [0; 1) the market competition variable (here quantity), a …rm pro…t function can be denoted as i (q (x)), where q (x) = (q 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ); q 2 (x 1 ; x 2 )).
In a research agreement f1; 2g …rms will therefore set cooperatively their level of investment at stage = t 1 or t 2 , i.e. given the pro…le of quantities optimally chosen at the market stage.
If the …rms play simultaneously as singletons at time = t 1 or t 2 , the appropriate equilibrium concept will be the Nash equilibrium x of the simultaneous investment game played at stage , i.e.
such that, for every i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i x i = arg max
Finally, if the …rms play sequentially, the relevant equilibrium will be a Stackelberg (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium, i.e. the pro…le (4) x = x i ; x j such that, for the leader (henceforth …rm i)
and for the follower (…rm j) x j = g j (x i ), where g j : X i ! X j is the best-reply mapping:
Note that for the investment game to be well-de…ned, all equilibria in (2), (3) and (4) must exist and be unique.
The Market Game
Once the two …rms have either formed a research cartel or chosen their R&D investment as singletons at t 1 or t 2 , they will set their market variable at the last stage of the game (denoted with t 3 ). We assume competition in quantities and a unique Cournot equilibrium among …rms, given the equilibrium level of investment x c , or x or x decided at stages t 1 , t 2 or both. In particular, the Cournot quantity pro…le is simply the vector
such that, for every …rm i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i;
Stable R&D Agreements
Given the equilibrium quantities decided by …rms at stage t 3 , and given the level of investment decided simultaneously or sequentially at stages t 1 and/or t 2 either by the research cartel or by individual …rms, …rms payo¤s can, with a slight abuse of notation, be denoted as i (q (x (P (m))), where q (x (P (m)) indicates the equilibrium quantity pro…le when an investment pro…le, as de…ned by (2) , or by (3) or …nally by (4) is chosen by the …rms in a given partition P (m) induced by the message pro…le m sent at stage t 0 .
Henceforth we make explicit a concept of equilibrium for the message game played at stage t 0 . For this purpose, we introduce two di¤erent equilibrium concepts. The …rst is a standard Nash equilibrium of the R&D partition-timing game. The second introduces a social stability requirement, implying that a structure P (m) is stable if and only if the message pro…le m is a strong Nash equilibrium, i.e., cannot be improved upon by an alternative message announced by a single …rm or by the two …rms together. This concept is useful to re…ne over the set of outcome generated by our model. Formally, when a given timing-partition P 2 P is Nash stable, the pro…le = (m ; x ; q ) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the entire game. When, in addition, the message pro…le m played at t 0 is also strong Nash, IS again a SPNE, with the additional property to be Pareto-optimal for the …rms.
De…nition 1 (Nash stability) A feasible R&D timing-partition P 2 P is Nash stable if P = P (m ), for some m with the following property:
for every m 0 i 2 M i and every …rm i = 1; 2 with j 6 = i.
De…nition 2 (Strong Nash stability) A feasible R&D timing-partition P 2 P is strongly
, for some b m with the following property: there not exists an alternative
for all i = 1; 2 and
for at least one h = 1; 2.
A strong stable Nash equilibrium is at once a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto-optimal message pro…le.
A Duopoly Model with Symmetric Spillovers
We are now ready to apply our framework to the d'Aspremont & Jacquemin's (1988) model.
We therefore consider a symmetric duopoly with …rms producing a homogeneous good. Along these lines, we assume a linear inverse market demand function P (Q) = max f0; a bQg ;
with Q = P 2 i=1 q i and a linear cost function for each …rm i decreasing in own R&D investment and in a fraction of the rival's e¤ort,
for j 6 = i, and c x i x j . In this setup, learning resulting from investment in R&D characterizes the production process, implying that marginal and unit costs decrease as the investment in R&D increases. We allow for the possibility of imperfect appropriability (i.e.
for the existence of a technological spillovers between the …rms), by introducing a spillover Here, the parameter in (5) is assumed to be identical for all …rms. However, in Section 4, this parameter, though exogenously given, will di¤er as due to the cooperative versus non-cooperative nature and to the timing properties of the R&D investment game.
Moreover, we assume a simple quadratic cost function for the investment in R&D given
with > 0. This guarantees decreasing returns to R&D expenditure (see e.g. Cheng 1984 and d'Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988). As a result, under Cournot competition in the product market, and setting for simplicity b = 1, the last stage pro…t function for each …rm i = 1; 2 can be obtained as a function of (x i ; x j ):
Main Assumptions
Some assumptions are now introduced to ensure the existence and uniqueness of all stages equilibria as well as to simplify the comparative statics.
A.1 Quantity stage constraint: (a=c) > 2.
A.2 Pro…t concavity and best-reply contraction: > 4=3. ) as well as a contraction property on every …rm best-replies g i (x j ), which requires that > 
Cooperative R&D
The R&D cartel made of the two …rms investing cooperatively in R&D is assumed to maximize the sum of …rms pro…ts, i.e.
where x = (x i ; x j ) is any arbitrary pro…le of R&D investment carried out simultaneously by the two …rms either at = t 1 or at = t 2 , for i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i. Following most of the literature, we will assume henceforth that the level of investment that maximizes (7) is equal for every …rm, i.e., is such that
By (7) a …rm cooperative investment can be easily obtained as
with an associated equilibrium pro…t for each …rm
Noncooperative Simultaneous R&D
Di¤erentiating (6) and exploiting the symmetry of …rms payo¤s, the noncooperative level of investment is obtained as
2(2 )(1 + ) for = 1; 2, with associated a pro…t given by:
Sequential R&D Investment Game
Using again (6) we can easily obtain the best-reply of the j-th …rm playing as follower the investment game:
Therefore the leader and the follower equilibrium investment levels are given by with associated equilibrium pro…ts given by
Comparing R&D equilibrium investment levels under assumptions A.1-A.3, we can state the following:
Proposition 1 (i) When …rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < ) there exists a ( ) and a such that, for < ( ) and < ,
(ii) When …rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < ) and ( ) or
(iii) When …rms R&D investments are strategic complements ( > 1 2
),
for i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above proposition provides a full ranking of …rms equilibrium investment levels, as 
i > x i and x i > x j > x i ). Proposition 1 completes this ranking by also including the cooperative investment levels. It can be noticed (see (11) ) that the level of spillover is crucial to determine the slope of the follower's best-reply in the investment game.
That is, when the spillover rate is very low (case (i)), the follower's best-reply is extremely steep (and negatively sloped) and this player strongly contracts its equilibrium investment, which is thus even lower than that resulting under a cooperative agreement. A …rm investing noncooperatively as leader at stage t 1 can therefore pro…tably expand its investment, and this may occur in particular when the unit cost of investment in R&D (i.e. ) is very low and the investor is unlikely to be imitated (low ). Under such circumstances, being a leader can be more pro…table than participating to an R&D agreement. When, instead, the spillover rates start to increase, the cooperative investment overcomes that of the follower, although the leader's investment remains very high. Finally, for > 1=2, cooperation implies the e¢ cient and highest level of R&D investment, regardless of the level of investment costs.
In what follows, we perform some comparisons of the …rms payo¤s obtained in the di¤er-ent investment games. 6 First, notice that, by the e¢ ciency of pro…le x c , we already know 6 We recall that in Amir's et al. (2000) paper, the following ranking is established for simultaneous and sequential payo¤s in the symmetric case:
, where L, N and F denote the leader/Nash simultaneous/follower roles, respectively, in the di¤erent R&D investment games. ) a follower (leader) payo¤ can never be greater than that of a …rm in a cooperative agreement. ) the pro…t of each …rm in an R&D agreement is always higher than the pro…t of a leader (follower), namely,
The following two propositions complete the full ranking of …rm payo¤s in all di¤erent scenarios and for all levels of spillover rates.
Proposition 2 When …rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < ): (i) there exists a ( ) and a such that, for < ( ) and < , the pro…t obtained by a …rm playing as leader in a sequential investment game is higher than that obtained in a cooperative R&D agreement, and the following ranking arises
(ii) When, instead ( ) or or both, the following ranking arises:
Proof. See the Appendix. Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the e¤ect of on the investment levels and on payo¤s, respectively. When …rm investments are strategic substitutes ( < 1=2) there exists a narrow range of the spillover rate (between 0 and ( )) for which being leader, and thus expanding the investment, turns out to be extremely pro…table. This occurs only when the cost to invest in R&D is extremely low ( < ).
[ ) the pro…t obtained by a …rm in a cooperative R&D agreement is always higher than the pro…t obtained by a …rm investing as follower in the sequential investment game, and the following ranking
As it can be observed in …gures 1 and 2, for > 1=2, the highest level of investment is selected by the research cartel. Under the sequential game the follower free-rides on the leader's investment and gains a higher pro…t.
Finally, the next two propositions characterize all Nash and strong Nash stable timingpartitions according to De…nitions 1 and 2.
Proposition 4 (Nash stability) (i) When the spillover rate is such that < ( ), and < , the Nash stable timing-partitions are given by investment game à la Nash. If, however, < ( ), we have proven that being leader in the investment game yields a higher pro…t than playing cooperatively, and therefore the only timing-partition that remains strongly stable is the alliance investing at time t 1 . Thus, a cooperative agreement, to be stable, requires that …rms anticipate strategically their joint investments.
Proposition 5 (Strong stability) (i) when the spillover rate < ( ) and < , the only strong Nash stable R&D timing-partition is
(ii) -(iii) When 1 ( ) or or both, the strong Nash stable R&D timingpartitions are
Proof. See the Appendix. give an intuition, in a scenario characterized by strategic substitutes, the choice to form a R&D alliance at a certain time might be also motivated by the need to avoid to play as follower and singleton. Besides, when both spillovers and unit investment costs are very low, a deliberate strategy meant to deter the exploitation of the …rst mover advantage (i.e. a possible strategy to appropriate innovation rents) might be in place. In a regime of high appropriability -and thus of low outgoing spillovers -the probability for …rms to cooperate is enhanced (as shown by Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, Belderbos et al. 2004) , and the only problem potentially a¤ecting stability may stem from the willingness to move …rst. This is not true any longer for higher spillovers and higher investment costs. In this case, we argue that the two forces behind spillovers may push to collaborate at time 1, when the need to internalize high incoming spillovers prevails, or at time 2, to avoid free-riding and potential defections by partners, typical of low appropriability scenarios.
An Extension to n-symmetric Firms
Extending our model to n-symmetric …rms would allow to check the stability of more complex alliances between …rms coordinating their investment in R&D. However, including more than two …rms into a model with endogenous timing makes the model itself highly unmanageable.
Only intuitive conclusions can be drawn employing our previous analysis and some wellknown existing results. A …rst observation concerns the whole industry R&D agreement (or the grand coalition of …rms) investing at stage t 2 , i.e., using the above notation, the timingpartition P = fN g t 2 formed when at stage t 0 all …rms i = 1; 2; ::; n send the message
). This partition can be strongly stable if every individual …rm investing as follower at stage t 2 would be better o¤ than any …rm participating to an R&D agreement investing at stage t 1 as leader. Thus, any coalition S N of …rms that deviates from the grand coalition fN g t 2 by sending one of these alternative messages, m 0 S = (fSg ; t 2 ) or m 00 S = (fSg ; t 1 ), would induce either the simultaneous partition
where all …rms outside S are singletons or, analogously, the sequential partition
However, if …rms in coalition S cannot improve upon partition fN g t 2 by playing as leaders as in (13) they would not improve a fortiori by playing simultaneously as in (12) . Therefore, if we show that in the partition (13) all …rms within the research cartel S (regardless of its size) do not improve upon the cooperative partition fN g t 2 , the stability of the grand coalition agreement is proved as a result. When investment decisions are strategic complements ( > 1=2), it can be proved that the payo¤ of a symmetric …rm playing as singleton follower against the coalition S playing as leader is always higher than the payo¤ of every …rm in S. Hence, given the e¢ ciency of the grand coalition, it would be impossible for any coalition S to improve by deviating as leader, given that followers would improve even more their payo¤s. Similarly, it can be shown that when R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < 1=2) a coalition S N made of followers is beaten by individual …rms investing as leaders, and therefore the partition fN g t 1 -made by the grand coalition of …rms investing at time t 1 -is strong Nash. The strong stability of these two cooperative timing-partitions already observed in our duopoly model thus extends to an analogous endogenous timing game played by n-symmetric …rms.
A Duopoly Model with Asymmetric Spillovers
Including asymmetric spillovers into the model equals to introducing a higher degree of Our assumptions on spillovers asymmetry are based on the following considerations: (i) When the two …rms invest simultaneously and noncooperatively at stage one or two their spillover rate is assumed to be symmetric and lower than or equal to 0:5 (i.e., (ii) When a noncooperative sequential investment in R&D takes place, the spillover rate can be though to be favorable to the …rm playing as follower and unfavorable to the …rm playing as leader (i.e. A sequential order of moves in the R&D investment game implies a greater amount of knowledge leaking out from the leader to the follower than vice versa. The rationale is that knowledge leaks also through imitation, thus leading to a strong advantage for the …rm that is able to observe the …rst mover innovative outcome. Therefore, bene…ts from spillovers should be lower for a …rst mover (see also Tesoriere 2008) . Moreover, we assume that sectorspeci…c features determining the intensity of knowledge di¤usion 9 a¤ect to the same extent the incoming spillover for the leader in the sequential game (i.e. (iii) When the two …rms play cooperatively and form a research cartel, they generally also agree to share to some extent the knowledge obtained from their joint R&D e¤ort. It seems realistic to assume that they might agree to fully share their knowledge, and therefore their spillover rates will be symmetric and su¢ ciently high (i.e. Taking into account all the above inequalities, our assumptions on the relationship among spillover values can be summarized as follows: (14) 1 As in the previous section, we introduce here some assumptions needed to ensure the existence and uniqueness of equilibria at all stages (see the Appendix for further details): 9 Empirical literature aiming at distinguishing between knowledge spillovers that occur within or across di¤erent sectors or technological …elds leads to conclude that spillovers are technology-speci…c and, thus, mainly intra-sectoral. As much as about sixty percent of the citations are directed to other patents classi…ed into the same technological …eld (see, e.g., Ja¤e 1985, 1986; Cincera 1997; Malerba et al 2007), while the main sources of knowledge are represented by competitors, suppliers and plants belonging to the same business group (Crespi et al, 2008) .
B.1 (quantity stage constraint).
As in the case of symmetric spillovers, a=c > 2. 
B.2 (Pro…t

Noncooperative Sequential R&D with Asymmetric Spillovers
Since only in the case of sequential moves at the investment stage our calculations di¤er from the symmetric case analyzed in the previous sections, we shall deal henceforth extensively with this scenario. Our aim is to investigate whether the asymmetry in the transmission of knowledge between …rms is relevant for the endogenous formation of research alliances.
Using an asymmetric-spillover speci…cation, every …rm objective function at the market game stage is given by
2 with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. Solving the game by backward induction, every …rm payo¤ at the investment stage can be obtained as:
Di¤erentiating (15) we obtain the best-reply for the follower in the investment game (here player j):
The sequential equilibrium investment levels for the two …rms are given by:
Let equation (14) as well as B.1-B.3 hold. By comparing …rms R&D equilibrium investment levels under asymmetric spillovers, we can state:
Proposition 6 There exists a~ 2 (0; 1=2) such that, if
x j > x i > x i , for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j.
An illustration of this result is shown in Figure 3 . To give an intuition, when (infrasectoral) spillovers are low, the asymmetry between the incoming spillover of the leader ( As depicted in …gure 4, there exists a value^ 2 (0; 1=2), such that the following payo¤s ranking emerges:
^ . As a result, in this case the Nash equilibrium timing-partitions are
while the only strong Nash partition is given by
When instead
^ , the following payo¤ ranking comes out:
and, thus, These results can be explained by considering that joint cooperative agreements at time t 1 are particularly at risk when there is a strong incentive to be follower in the R&D investment game. As a matter of fact, …rms prefer to wait and observe the rival's move rather then trying to reach an agreement. This happens when spillovers are extremely unbalanced (i.e. when . Under these assumptions he proves that the only timing con…guration that is SPNE involves simultaneous noncooperative play at the R&D stage (with zero spillovers). In contrast, in our setup the noncooperative simultaneous con…gura-tion may not be the only Nash stable timing-partition and, in addition, it is never strong Nash stable, as …rms always prefer to form an R&D cartel than playing (suboptimally) as singletons the investment game.
Concluding Remarks
This paper represents a …rst attempt to bridge two usually distinct streams of the economic literature, the endogenous formation of R&D agreements, and the endogenous timing of R&D investments in a model with spillovers à la d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) . This is done by introducing a new setup in which …rms express both their intention to form or not an alliance as well as the timing of their e¤ort in R&D. Our approach allows to assess the stability of research cartels against deviations occurring over time. We show that the nature of the interaction between the …rms in the investment game plays an important role. In particular, under symmetric spillovers and when the level of spillovers is extremely low, both …rms want to play the investment game as leaders and, as a result, they may easily end up investing simultaneously either cooperatively or noncooperatively. In this case, any cooperative agreement, to be stable, must contain a commitment to invest at an initial stage. A cooperative agreement of this sort would remain stable against deviations by coalitions of …rms even if the number of symmetric …rms gets arbitrarily higher than two. When spillovers are higher, our model predicts that both sequential (noncooperative) and simultaneous (cooperative) R&D con…gurations are stable against individual deviations.
However, only cooperative agreements are strongly stable and, in this case, opposite forces, pushing towards either cooperation at the initial stage or to strategic delay of joint R&D investment might be in place. We have argued that this approach, by introducing endogenous timing into the model, may help in explaining some stylized facts, such as the tendency to postpone a portion of agreements in some industries, as the bio-pharmaceutical sector.
Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and favourable to the …rm investing as follower, the model shows that an R&D alliance, to be stable, requires the joint investment to be strategically delayed in order to avoid that a …rm may break the agreement to exploit the existing "second-mover advantage". This occurs, in particular, when the incoming spillover of the leader is much lower then that of the follower, a scenario typical of low knowledge transmission sectors. 
It follows that
contradicting the e¢ ciency of pro…le x c i (q ). Similarly, for < 
which again implies
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) By Lemma 1 and employing Amir's et al. (2000) results
we know that, under low spillover rates, (
For 2 [0; 1=2) the following equation
has only one root ( ) = 
0:
The payo¤s ranking can therefore be completed using Lemma 1 and Amir's et al. (2000) results.
Proof ), either
For ; 1 , the equation
is solved only for = 1=2: It can be checked that for any other spillover rate 1
is positive and increases monotonically in . Only for ! +1, it occurs that
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) By proposition 2, for 2 [0; ( )) < 1=2 and < , investing as leader at stage t 1 is more pro…table for …rms than forming a cooperative agreement. As a result, the message m = f1; 2g t 2 cannot be a Nash equilibrium, since a …rm i can pro…tably deviates with an alternative message m 0 i = (fig ; t 1 ) inducing the timing-partition fig  t 1 ; fjg t 2 . Similarly, all sequential timing-partitions fig  t 1 ; fjg t 2 can pro…tably be objected by the j-th …rm who, instead of playing as follower, would rather prefer to invest simultaneously. This is feasible if it sends the message m t 1 ; fjg t 1 . However, the latter partition can, in turn, be objected by a message f1; 2g t 1 sent by both …rms, and therefore, is not Strong Nash stable. Finally, also the partition f1; 2g t 2 can be objected by a …rm sending an alternative message m 0 i = (fig ; t 1 ) , hence inducing the relatively more pro…table sequential partition fig  t 1 ; fjg t 2 .
(ii) By proposition 2 and 3 it follows that, for 2 [ ( ); 1], all sequential and simultaneous noncooperative payo¤s are dominated by the cooperative agreements. As a result, the two message pro…les m = (fi; jg ; t 1 ) ; (fi; jg ; t 1 )) and m = (fi; jg ; t 2 ) ; (fi; jg ; t 2 )) are both strongly undominated and the two cooperative partitions f1; 2g t 1 ; f1; 2g t 2 are both strongly stable.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider …rst the equilibrium investment levels under the extreme assumptions that for i = 1; 2.
Then, (a) By simply comparing (25) and (26), we obtain that x c i
.
(b) Considering Eqs (24) and (23), it comes out that (x i x j ) L i =0; 3 + 32) < 0.
i¤ > 4=3, and this is implied by assumption B.2.
for > 4=9 + 4 p 2=9, which, as shown above, is always respected.
Combining all inequalities above, we have
We now examine the ranking of R&D investments when 
Let now introduce the more general hypotheses that 
due to the SOC for the pro…t maximization problem when …rms compete simultaneously at the investment stage and the constraints hold on as stated above.
(3) Also, (4) Then, we obtain that
and …nally
As a result,
The same ranking holds also for any value of
This can be proven considering that
The above expression is strictly positive since the term in square brackets at the numerator is negative (and decreasing in ), the second term at the denominator is the SOC for simultaneous competition at the investment stage (see B.2), and the third term at the denominator is negative for any > 0:5 due to the constraints on (see B.2). Now, . Therefore: 
, with su¢ ciently small. It is easy to see that
. Moreover, letting , since x j is monotonically increasing in could ever be feasible. It is easily found that the inequality x i > x i contradicts the above …nding, i.e. that 
The fact that both x j and x i are monotonically decreasing in 
Assumptions under Symmetric Spillovers
A.1 Straightforward manipulations of …rms'payo¤s at the quantity-stage yield (27) q
and then (2 ) 2 and then strict-concavity of i (x (q )) in x i is guaranteed for > 8 9 for any 2 [0; 1]. Firms'best-replies are obtained from (28) and are given by:
Moreover, since for every …rm
increasing di¤erences of i (x i ; x j ) in (x i ; x j ) (and then non decreasing best-replies) are implied by > 1 2
and decreasing di¤erences (and non increasing best-replies) are implied by
To guarantee that uniqueness of Nash equilibrium x (q ), a contraction condition would serve the scope. This condition is respected for g 0 i (x j ) < 1 when the function is increasing and for g 0 i (x j ) > 1; when the function is decreasing, thus requiring
. Condition (30) implies
which is satis…ed for
Since the RHS in (32) is monotonically increasing in , (32) becomes
Condition (31) equals to
and thus
Since the expression on the RHS of (34) is monotonically increasing in , we obtain the condition > (i) Using the FOC for each …rm i = 1; 2 when playing simultaneously the investment game, we obtain that
which, setting x i = 0, becomes
for every x j 2 [0; c]. As a result, to play x i = 0 is never a best-reply for a …rm .
(ii) Secondly, when a …rm i = 1; 2 participates to a cooperative R&D agreement, its FOC is
which, evaluated at x = (0; x j ), becomes
It is thus never rational for a …rm in a cooperative agreement to play
, no matter what the other …rm does.
(iii) Finally, for a …rm i = 1; 2 investing as a leader, the FOC is
Notice that for > ; the opposite holds, given that
, and expression (35) guarantees that a …rm as a leader will always invest a strictly positive amount at a sequential equilibrium. Moreover, since the FOC for a follower is the same as in the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, at the sequential equilibrium both …rms will never play the pro…le x = (0; 0). To conclude, we want to be sure that both …rms will never play their full cost reduction investment (corner solution), and that instead either their best-replies or their cooperative decisions always lie below their maximum rational level (37)
(i) and (iii) Under noncooperative behaviour and using (37), this is guaranteed if
As a result, for
that is, both simultaneous and sequential investment equilibria are interior and lie below the boundary points. Instead for (ii) For a …rm participating to a cooperative R&D agreement, its FOC evaluated at Being the RHS of (44) decreasing in N i , we obtain that the most stringent condition on is given by > 8 9 .
Note that this condition also guarantees that the SOC for the maximization problem of an R&D alliance playing the investment game is respected. In this case the SOC is given by
and, being increasing in C i -and given our assumptions on C i -the above condition is respected for > 8 9 .
Moreover, when both …rms play simultaneously the investment stage, and given that As a result, since (46) is increasing in j and decreasing in i , the most stringent constraint on becomes > .
B.3 First de…ne as (x i ; x j ) the point at which the boundary lines given by
intersect. It is easily found that:
>From the pro…t maximization problem for a …rm under asymmetric spillovers, we have
[(a c) + (2 ) x i + (2 1) x j ] x i = 0 from which the following best-reply is obtained:
In order to show that this best-reply lies underneath the point (x i ; x j ), it su¢ ces to impose that, when the incoming spillover i is greater that 1=2 for at least one …rm, 
:
Given that, for a sequential equilibrium, 1 > Also in this case the constraint on required under cooperation (eq. 52) is the most stringent and thus will be the one to be imposed.
Finally, combining both constraints in B.1 and in B.3 for the sequential investment game, the most demanding condition on is > 1. Moreover, in the noncooperative simultaneous investment stage, the same constraint on has to be satis…ed, whilst, under the cooperative case, it is required that > 16=9.
This is the most stringent condition also employed in the numerical simulations with asymmetric spillovers. 
